On Nov. 29, two workers died in an explosion and fire at the Enbridge Energy oil pipeline terminal in Clearbrook, Minn. Two days later, another worker was reported missing following an explosion and fire at the Marathon Petroleum Co. in St. Paul Park, Minn. Both accidents are under investigation.

The same day as the Clearbrook explosion, the United Steelworkers released a detailed survey of 51 refineries across the United States where the union represents workers. The report included feedback from workers at the Flint Hills refinery in Rosemount, Minn.

The union found many of the same conditions that led to the fatal March 2005 blast at a British Petroleum refinery in Texas City, Texas. Fifteen people were killed and hundreds injured.

The U.S. Chemical Safety Board strongly criticized BP for numerous safety failings, including failing to monitor safety of the entire production process and cutting back safety personnel, in an earlier report. Its chair told Congress hazards found at Texas City easily apply not just to the whole oil industry, but to factories in general.

USW\'s report, with data, confirmed her findings about the oil firms.

"We have circulated this report to all our locals in the petrochemical refining industry and mailed it to the companies," Gerard said. "We intend to launch a major education campaign of our members and hopefully we\'ll get agreement with the companies on educating workers on safety conditions." BP has agreed, he added.

If the other oil firms don\'t, USW is prepared to take the refinery safety issue to Congress, to the presidential campaign, and to bargaining, he warned.

"We really, really need to ramp up how process safety standards are addressed" by the firms and by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Gerard explained. Process safety standards cover a refinery\'s entire operations and production processes, not just individual components. But OSHA has conducted few process safety inspections nationwide in the last decade--and none at Texas City.

"In OSHA, there\'s been almost a walking away by its senior managers from process safety," Gerard added.

Still another hazard is the oil firms\' determination to subcontract safety monitoring to outsiders who are often unfamiliar with petrochemical production processes, he said. To its credit, BP has reversed course on that since Texas City, which killed 15 people and injured hundreds of others.

Those 15 were in flimsy trailers--trailers found at other refineries, the report says --and didn\'t need to be there. They were "non-essential" clerical workers, it notes. The report says the same situations exist elsewhere. Specifically:

* Workers at 90 percent of the 51 refineries said their facilities had at least one of the conditions -- use of atmospheric vents, placement of trailers and allowance of non-essential personnel -- found at Texas City. Sixty-one percent of the respondents, representing 31 refineries, reported at least one incident or near miss involving at least one of the four contributing factors in the past three years.

* Many of the refineries that had at least one of the four conditions reported after the BP explosion either did not take action or took actions judged as less than very effective. A review of past refinery disasters also revealed similar hazardous conditions being repeated and not learned from.

"These conditions have existed for 30 years," added USW Vice President Gary Beevers. Gerard said the only reason other refineries haven\'t exploded as Texas City did is "luck."

* Refiners are not following OSHA\'s process safety standard. When 16 process safety systems for startups or shutdowns were rated, 87 percent of workers said the overall management of process safety systems at their sites was less than very effective.

* Other shortfalls included inadequate staffing, lack of safety preparedness for the contract workers, insufficient refinery preparation for handling hazardous materials emergencies and lack of emergency response training for the general plant population.

"It is time for the oil industry to step up to the plate and promptly address these deficiencies in process safety," said Beevers. "The oil companies can afford to do this and have a moral obligation to do so. A disaster like the explosion in Texas City is totally preventable."

"Some urgent critical actions" must be taken to stop further blasts, Beevers said. They include establishing process safety management teams at every refinery, eliminating the faulty atmospheric vents, banning non-essential personnel during startups and shutdowns "and providing efficient participatory training," including USW, The union has offered to train workers in safety and even pay the costs.

This article is adapted from one written by Press Associates, Inc., news service.

For more information
View the USW report at www.uswa.org

Learn more about the U.S. Chemical Safety Board at www.csb.gov